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Abstract: The paper departs from the analysis of the regionalizing processes, 
as Björn Hettne coined the spontaneous empirical trend driven by transnational 
corporations. They evolved within Southeast-Asia from the end of 1980s, despite 
a very low level of intergovernmental institutionalization within ASEAN. The 
activity of global and regional value chains increasingly webbing the ASEAN 
region is traced back to trade and investment relations and their change over 
time in 1995-2018. Regionalizing processes have been followed from the mid-
nineties by intergovernmental negotiations on membership expansion and 
moving towards a single market and production base, facilitating the “bottom 
up” dynamics from the “top-down” level. Impacts of the US-China Trade War 
and Covid-19 pandemic are analysed to draw future prospects. 
Keywords: East-Asian regionalization, ASEAN+3, AEC 2015, global value chain 
disruptions 
Introduction 
The notion of the ‘Asian Century’ has surfaced in academic literature and political 
discourse over the past decade, claiming and prophesying that growth and 
development in the 21st century will be spearheaded by Asia (following the US 
dominance of the 20th century, with the 19th century being Europe’s). A recent 
study by McKinsey Global Institute provides facts and forecasts on how the global 
centre of gravity is shifting towards Asia. A substantial rise was demonstrated 
already between 2000-2017 in Asia’s share in global GDP from 32-42%, in global 
consumption from 23-28% and in the world’s middle class from 23-40%. By 2040, 
Asia is likely to generate more than 52% of real world GDP (in purchasing-power-
parity), and could account for 39% of global consumption and 54% of the share 
of the world’s middle class according to the study (Tonby, Woetzel et al., 2019:2). 
Parag Khanna1 paints in his recent book, The Future is Asian, an Asian Century 
which is not to be marked only by China’s increasing global role, but a multipolar, 
multifaceted, entangled Asia, with a further strengthening position of ASEAN and 
India as well (Khanna, 2019).
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Reflecting on Asia’s increasing geo-economic and consequently geo-political 
importance, this paper intends to shed light specifically on the ASEAN region and 
the ASEAN+3 area, involving China, Japan and South Korea too and the evolving 
regionalizing processes around them driven by global value chains of transnational 
corporations since the 1990s. 
Catching a glance at the history of the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), we can observe, that although it was established only a decade later 
than the European Economic Community was created by the Treaty of Rome, the 
way and speed of integration of the two groups of countries followed an entirely 
different path. ASEAN is seeking to unite very heterogeneous nations both in 
terms of their political systems and their economic development levels in a non-
binding, non-interfering, consensus-driven way even after the 50th anniversary of 
its foundation with the Bangkok Declaration. ASEAN plays a central role in the 
regional Asia-Pacific architecture interconnecting Asiatic and Transatlantic nations, 
just to mention a few examples: APEC, ASEAN+3 (APT), and the RCEP. A rapid 
spread of bilateral Free Trade agreements (FTAs) webbing the ASEAN region and 
its East-Asian neighbours has been experienced since the mid-nineties, bringing 
to the fore East-Asia2 globally by the 2010s in this field. These developments were 
further spurred by two major economic crises: the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 
the 2008 Global Financial and Economic Crisis. It has been referred to in Asian 
academic and expert literature as the “noodle-bowl” or “spaghetti bowl effect”, used 
interchangeably, referring to the fact that the individual FTAs, like individual pieces 
of noodles add to the whole, instead of a multilateral framework. The “noodle bowl 
effect” has a negative connotation since by keeping a multitude of overlapping rules 
of origin (ROO) legislation in the individual FTAs, any gains from the increased 
trade turnover are reduced due to the transaction costs, estimated by economists 
to 3-5% of the total export value (ADB 2008:22). ASEAN members initiated their 
internal FTA in 1992 and as a direct partner signed so-called ASEAN+1 FTAs with 
major regional powers: China, Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, Australia, India 
and New Zealand. The latest ASEAN+1 FTA came into force with Hong Kong and 
China in 2019. 
One of the distinct features of the ASEAN integration process is, that after decades 
of intergovernmental status quo, the integration started to unfold very slowly as a 
response to the activity of global value chains of transnational corporations (TNCs) 
in the region (Magasházi, 2015).
The current paper starts out from theories and concepts that try to grasp the 
specificities of the “ASEAN way” of integration, the move from regionalization to 
regionalism. Empirical analysis will follow to depict the trends of intra-regional trade 
and investments among the ASEAN as well as the ASEAN+3 member countries 
(China, ROK, Japan), their global connectivity, steered by global value chains 
(GVCs) in the 1996-2018 period. A major milestone of the evolving intergovernmental 
institutionalization from the 1990’s has been the endeavour to create the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) 2015, followed up by the envisaged ASEAN 2025 
strategy. A region entangled so densely by activities of GVCs has found itself from 
2018 in the forefront of global economic tensions. Provoked by the USA-China 
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Trade War and the Covid-19 pandemic causing disruptions and reconfigurations 
of GVCs with regional impacts, emerging countries on other continents can draw 
conclusions as well. 
Literature Review
Alongside the statistical trends and empirical results behind the development of the 
ASEAN integration, concepts that intend to explain the impacts of global forces 
– global value chain, global production network research frameworks as well as 
specific concepts of scholars in economics, management and theory of international 
relations are worthy of review. 
Based on the Southeast Asian experience, Das brought into the literature, 
the terminology of the market-driven integration. He claims that “microeconomic 
decision-making in large firms, particularly transnational corporations (TNCs) played 
an active role in the spread of regionalization” (Das 2005:1). While liberalization of 
trade and FDI has evolved already from the 1970s in the Southeast-Asian countries 
and attracted transnational corporations seeking profit optimization into the region, 
it was the Plaza Accord in 1985 which changed the currency value configuration 
and spurred Japanese investments across the region.3 The strategy of the TNCs in 
organizing their manufacturing from the nineties shifted from head-office-subsidiary 
relations to network aspects. Southeast-Asian countries, led in this process by 
Singapore, used the opportunity by conscious state policies for industrial upgrading 
already in the nineties (Gereffi, 1995). The global value chain literature deals in detail 
with theoretical concepts and empirical studies, how TNCs fine-slice parts of their 
production processes with a punctuality that has never been seen before, and settle 
individually to optimal places according to competitive advantages (Buckley, 2009). 
The global production network (GPN) literature inspired by the discipline of geography, 
concentrates specifically on the changing configuration of the networks (Coe, Dicken, 
Hess (2006)) compared to the governance aspect focus of GVC literature (Gereffi, 
Humprey, Sturgeon (2005). The fragmentation of production processes has created 
transnational and cross-border production systems, causing intense integration and 
functional interconnectedness. Southeast-Asian countries were the first ones that 
collected the valuable practices in this new division of labour. Production networks 
became a major force behind the market-driven integration of the region. 
Hettne’s distinction between regionalism and regionalization connects simply and 
well the macro and micro level analysis. The notion of regionalism describes the 
process initiated by governments in a top-down way, while the notion of regionalization 
is “an empirical trend depicting a multidimensional process of regional change that 
occurs simultaneously at several levels of social, political and economic interactions 
in a bottom-up process” (Hettne, 2003). Hettne (1996) calls the top-down process of 
evolving regionalism in the 1990s as “new regionalism”, which differs from the “old” 
post WW2 form, providing one way of coping with global transformation, since most 
states lack the capacity and the means to manage such a task on the national level. 
While the old regionalism emerged in a bipolar Cold War context, the new one is 
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taking shape in a multipolar world order, exemplified also by the turn in the ASEAN 
integration process from the nineties. When examining the top-down “regionalism” 
aspect of the ASEAN integration, scholars of international relations (IR) look at the 
question of rules versus relations in regional governance. They intend to resolve 
how ASEAN could achieve several decades of peace and economic development 
despite its informal, loose framework. They claim that “the ASEAN way” cannot be 
explained purely by the mainstream (IR) theory – as it is based more on relations 
due, in part, to several Confucian societies existing among its members. Yaquing 
(2001) argues that the unit of analysis is relations among individual actors, and how 
relations harmonize during the process. Wunderlich, in his comparative view between 
the EU and ASEAN brings a historic element, the unfinished state-building in the 
post-colonialist Asian states, into his concept. I tend to agree with his statement: 
“While European integration is partially driven by the drive to restrain or at least pool 
sovereignty, ASEAN regionalism is driven by the desire to consolidate state-building 
and sovereignty in Southeast Asia.” (Wunderlich, 2007:5). It was the European 
example of widening and deepening integration in the nineties, that “triggered a wave 
of new regionalism (APEC) or revival of old ones” (Wunderlich, 2007:29), that acted 
as one of the factors impacting the development of ASEAN integration as well. 
It can certainly be said that discussions behind the decisions in East-Southeast 
Asia are different from the EU. There are long chains of informal interstate 
consultations for years till the full consensus is reached. In several cases the issue 
lost its relevance in the meantime. This process has been convincingly explained by 
the Secretary-General of ASEAN 2008-2012, an opinion leader in the region, the late 
Surin Pitsuwan4 at the conference held in the Institute of Foreign Relations and Trade 
on March 31, 2016 in Budapest. He claimed that ASEAN “got the inspiration from the 
EU, but ASEAN is very different. While in the EU, legal documents regulate interstate 
relations, East-Asia is in continuous flux, and cannot be constrained by rigid frames.” 
While the level of democracy and main macroeconomic indicators of the member 
candidates to the EU are thoroughly analysed before accepting a new member, 
it is enough in Southeast-Asia that the respective countries belong to the same 
geographical area. Thus the 10 member states of ASEAN, with a total population over 
649 million (ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, 2019) encompasses states with entirely 
different political regimes: from royal monarchies, socialist countries, capitalist “one-
party systems” to (as Pitsuwan described them), “noisy young democracies”. The 
countries in the latter category are most often slowing down the process to find the 
common denominator. “The speed of ASEAN is equal to the speed of the slowest 
country”- he noted. (Pitsuwan, 2016). 
Global Value Chains and East-Asian Regionalisation – 
Facts and Figures
Looking behind the trade and FDI developments in the region, emphasis is put on 
intra-ASEAN relations, connectivity between ASEAN and its three major East-Asian 
partners: Japan, China and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as well as ASEAN’s relations 
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with the major advanced global centres of gravity: EU and USA. By 2017, 50 
years after its establishment, ASEAN has become the 4th major trading area (after 
EU, US and China), with 7.2% share in global trade.
Looking at the 1995-2011 export and import developments of the ASEAN five 
founding members5 and Brunei, a major increase can be followed starting from 
2002, leaving behind the drops in export and import figures due to the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and the 2001 dot.com crisis of the digital industry, illustrated on 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1
Trend of ASEAN 6 Total Exports and Imports, 1995-20116
A study by Gopalan (2020) underlines in his analysis, that the domestic value 
added share (DVA) in exports of the ASEAN countries fell in the 1995 to 2011 
period from 70% to 67%, while total exports increased many times, driven by 
intermediate exports – mostly related to GVCs. The remarkable increase in 
gross exports also led to substantial growth in jobs. Using empirical evidence, 
researchers showed that increase in imports is equally advantageous in the 
time of GVCs; intermediate imports of goods and services (foreign value added 
– FVA) play a positive role in enhancing employment as well as productivity in 
the ASEAN countries. Rapid trade increase went hand in hand with substantial 
per capita GDP increase, an emerging middle-class and increasing domestic 
markets. 
Trade developments of the individual ASEAN 6 countries in the 1995-2011 
period show that Singapore had built up its leading role with a widening gap from 
the rest of ASEAN. Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia followed with a similar 
speed of up-ticking exports and, like Singapore, they had the momentum for a 
dynamic increase in exports after the 2008-2009 crisis as well. 
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Figure 2
Trend of ASEAN Total Export by Country, 1995-20117
A concise statistical analysis backed summary (UNCTAD, 2013) on the activity of 
GVCs concluded that foreign value added in exports provides for a good estimate 
of the extent to which a global or regional value chain is segmented. This proportion 
is especially high in the electronics and automotive industries (UNCTAD, 2013:131). 
The UNCTAD summary states furthermore that Southeast Asia has the highest 
level of GVC participation. De Backer and Yamano’s research findings confirm that 
emerging countries such as China, Singapore and Malaysia were the most successful 
in increasing their specialization in intermediates (de Backer & Yamano, 2012:16). 
Based on the above findings, current analysis intends to get a closer look at the 
product group  H85 “Electrical Machinery, Sound Recorders etc.”8, to track the increasing 
role of GVCs in East-Asia within the ASEAN+3 context and review ASEAN’s global 
interconnectedness. Of the ASEAN member countries, and from the newly industrializing 
East Asian economies and China, the electronics industry only dominated in Singapore 
in the early 1990s, accounting for 46% of total output in manufacturing, thanks to the 
country’s FDI-based, export-driven industrialization. She not only gained competitive 
advantage since the 1970s, but could also retain this advantage through continuous and 
conscious upgrading of the electronics industry in the 1990–2015 period (Magasházi, 
2018.). Similar processes started in advanced East-Asian countries from the mid-nineties.
The inclusion of East-Asia into electronics GVCs can be seen by the multiple 
increase in the HS85 product category in the 1996-2000 figures (Table 1). The 
share of the product group substantially increased in intra-ASEAN trade too - both 
on the export and import side and especially in the export relations with the major 
advanced economies (EU, US and Japan), the main markets of their products. 
Exports to the US grew in this product category 46 times within 4 years; 34 times 
to the EU and 29 times to Japan. A dynamic upsurge of imports from the US and 
Japan can be observed in the same period suggesting the dominant activity of TNC 
networks headquartered in those countries
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Table 1
The role of electric machinery, equipments and parts, sound recorders etc
 (HS 85) in ASEAN trade (1996-2018)9
Note: Figures for 1996 and 2000 cover only ASEAN 6 in the ASEAN Trade 
Statistics Database
1996 2000 2010 2018
USD mill. % USD mill % USD mill % USD mill %
Intra-ASEAN
HS 85 exports 12380.5 26.4 34441.2 38.1 59490.4 22.2 77958.1 22.5
Total exports 46926.0 90440.8 267981.0 346462.0
HS 85 imports 12293.7 21.4 28195.1 40.1 55184.4 21.9 66540.6 21.9
Total imports 57380.5 69150.7 251823.8 304267.2
ASEAN-US
HS 85 exports 520.7 26.2 24014.0 35.5 23911.9 23.8 39626.2 24.7
Total exports 1988.2 67685.0 100464.7 160283.5
HS 85 imports 322.2 13.2 18598.9 40.2 22862.6 26.5 21254.1 20.7
Total imports 2445.6 46315.3 86220.0 102739.6
ASEAN-EU
HS 85 exports 674.2 9.0 22957.7 40.0 26983.8 23.5 46693.5 29.0
Total exports 7474.1 57555.0 115036.4 160936.5
HS 85 imports 1982 21.5 11340.5 30.1 19015.2 20,3 19795.5 15.6
Total imports 9217.6 36934.8 93548.4 127288.8
ASEAN-Japan
HS 85 exports 464.1 12.5 13526.7 26.0 22069.1 21.4 27053.2 23.6
Total exports 3722.8 51982.8 102890.8 114833.5
HS 85 imports 174.2 6.1 21215.0 34.6 24106.1 23,2 27053.2 23.1
Total imports 2843.8 61404.9 103746.3 116881.9
ASEAN-China
HS85 exports 3308.7 31.3 2561.2 21.0 28951.8 25.6 54039.7 27.2
Total exports 10571.6 12222.7 112999.8 198955.7
HS85 imports 1607.2 27.4 5355.9 31.8 30754.9 25.8 85521.3 30.0
Total imports 5866.7 16840.1 119013.4 284809.0
ASEAN-Korea
H85 exports 1496.1 15.8 3699.1 26.1 11322.6 25.2 17616.6 29.1
Total exports 9446.4 14145.2 44980.1 60489.6
H85 imports 4760.8 35.8 6300.9 43.5 20319.8 37.9 43553.4 43.1
Total imports 13294.4 14470.7 53648.2 101025.0
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The involvement of the Republic of Korea (RoK) increased considerably from 2000 
onwards, both as a market of the products and even more substantially on the import 
side, providing valuable electronic input and advanced products to the ASEAN markets, 
thanks to their own TNCs’ regional and global networks. According to the micro-level 
analysis of  Apple products, after Apple, the next biggest beneficiaries in the iPhone supply 
chain were South Korean companies, as upgrading within the value chain in the period 
2000–2010 had been achieved by them. The initial stage of iPod manufacturing relied 
on Japanese (mainly Toshiba’s) hard drive technology, while Korea’s Samsung 
and LG became the prime suppliers of the flash memory technology used in the 
iPhone and iPad (Kraemer et al. 2011).
Generally, the reconfiguration of GVCs to increasingly East-Asian regional 
supply chains is reflected in the rapid emergence of China from 2000 onwards. 
Exports to China in the HS85 product segment increased 11-fold, imports from 
China 5.7-fold between 2000 and 2010, marching further in the concise data 
availability 2010-18 period as well. The figures show furthermore that imports from 
Republic of Korea (RoK) increased substantially on the account of the first-mover 
supplier countries: Japan and US as well as the EU. Intra-ASEAN exports and 
imports in electronics increased substantially in the 1996-2010 period – showing 
an increasing level of integration – in the sense of “regionalization” as defined by 
Björn Hettne. 
Alongside this multifaceted integration by global firms in the ASEAN region, 
vertical disintegration can be also observed in TNC networks. In the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, as a result of the trend to outsource electronic manufacturing 
activities by TNCs to third parties rather than perform them at their own plants, 
contract manufacturing had been growing by 20% per year compared to previous 
decades (Buckley & Ghauri, 2004). Some former East-Asian domestic suppliers, 
such as Foxconn/HonHai (Taiwan) or Venture Corporation and WBL (Singapore), 
benefitted from this new trend after the new millennium and have become TNCs 
of global significance themselves, taking over the lead from the US first mover 
contract manufacturers (Flextronics, Celestica). At first, East Asian firms joined 
GVCs as simple component suppliers, then they developed their own production 
planning and design capacities to become original design manufacturers (ODMs). 
This radical organizational change within the industry provided a new global 
opportunity for domestic firms of emerging economies contributing to further 
increase of the region’s flagship industry. GVCs interweaving East Asia had, and 
still have, a definitive role in the economic development of countries covering the 
region as a whole, as also seen in the continuous increase of the intra-ASEAN 
trade in the product category in the 1996-2000 and 2010-2018 period.
However, it has also to be mentioned regarding the soaring figures that, as a 
result of cross-border stages of production, today the processes within the world 
economy can hardly be explained by statistical evidence on gross trade flows 
between national economies. In various stages as a semi-finished product, the 
same product may cross the borders of a country multiple times back and forth 
until it reaches its ultimate destination as a finished product. This causes double 
counting in global gross trade figures (Koopman et al., 2010; Timmer et al., 2013). 
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According to experts, the average foreign value-added in exports at the global level 
was approximately 28% in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2013). This information gap gave rise to 
the creation of new input-output databases that are still far from being fully developed 
with respect to the scope of countries included, the periods examined and data 
updates (WIOD, TiVA, ICIO, UNCATD-Eora). ASEAN member states (AMS) with 
higher shares in goods trade also have higher shares in services relative to other 
AMS with the exception of Singapore and Vietnam. Singapore has a much higher 
share of trade in services (47.1% versus 27.8% for trade in goods) in 2017, while 
Vietnam’s trade is more tied to goods. (17.1% versus 5.4% for trade in services). 
While the expansion of GVCs are mirrored by trade developments, FDI flow 
is a major driver behind the regionalization of ASEAN and East Asia, and the 
region’s growing embeddedness into the global economy. Comparable figures 
are available only till 2018, thus 
Table 2    
Inward FDI Flows to ASEAN by Selected Source Countries 1995-201810
As Table 2. illustrates, total inward FDI flows into ASEAN, as well as intra-ASEAN 
ows were 7.3 times higher in 2018 than in the starting year of analysis, in 1995. 
As annual FDI flows have seasonality, the trend in the selected years in the period 
confirm a major jump especially following the 2008-2009 crisis. While in the 1995-
2001 period ASEAN countries following FDI-led industrialization strategy relied 
mostly on Japan, EU and USA, the East-Asian emerging economies, China and 
also Republic of Korea represent an increasing share from 2009. According to 
figures in 2017, about 95% of intra-ASEAN investments came from three source 
countries, Singapore (69% share), followed by Malaysia and Thailand. Singapore’s 
contribution surpassed even Japan, in an East-Asian context – confirming how 
intensely the city-state is entangled in GVCs, investing out of Singapore, as their 
regional hub. According to final FDI figures in 2018, ASEAN received in 2018 
USD 154.7 billion inward capital flow, which made up 11.9% of total global FDI 
inflows. The figure was the highest in its history, ranking third after the EU and 
the US. The region’s outward investments also grew markedly amounting to USD 
1995 2000 2009 2014 2018
mill USD % mill USD % mill USD % mill USD % mill USD %
ASEAN 3187.7 15.2 959.1 9.2 8807.8 20.3 22180.9 17 23188.4 15.1
China 113.7 0.5 57.1 0.5 2068.7 4.8 6165,2 4.8 9940.1 6.5
Japan 4238 20.2 -55.5 n.a. 3451.1 8 13436.1 10.3 20964.5 13.7
RoK 627.9 3 179.7 1.7 1804.1 4.2 5257.2 4 -223 n.a.
EU28 3648.9 17.4 2905.8 27.9 5659.9 13.1 28943.3 22.2 21613.5 14.1
USA 3262.1 15.6 2320.4 22.2 5180.8 11.9 21141.3 16.2 8340.7 5.5
Total 20912.1 10408.4 43365.4 130114.5 152755.3
83Global and Regional Supply Chains in East-Asia...
Foreign Policy Review
69.6 billion – 6.9% of the world total. (ASEAN Integration Report 2019) As an 
example, Thailand’s outward FDI surpassed in 2018 substantially its inward FDI 
flow, amounting to USD 20.7 billion (Bank of Thailand, 2019).
Table 3
Inward FDI fows into ASEAN by Host Country 1995-201811
Note: 2018 figures are preliminary
*divestments because of political and economic crisis in Indonesia
From the individual ASEAN countries Singapore is the main recipient of inward FDI 
fowing into the region amounting to 34.5% -61.4% share in 1995-2018. ASEAN’s 
strategy to invite and integrate the less-developed Southeast-Asian economies 
(Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, Vietnam – CLMV countries) from 1995 onwards shows 
its results in the FDI statistics as well. In 2018, Vietnam took the third place behind 
the globally more entangled Singapore and Indonesia, which attracts investors 
with a consumer market of 267.7 million population (2018) in terms of inward 
FDI-share, surpassing large ASEAN founding nations such as Malaysia, Thailand 
or the Philippines. (Table 3). In an East-Asian context, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and ASEAN were the main investors in Vietnam, contributing 67 per cent 
of inward investments in 2017 (ASEAN Investment Report 2018).
Fukinari Kimura argued that although we observe similar cross-border 
production sharing in the US–Mexico nexus and in the Western Europe (WE)–
Central/Eastern Europe (CEE) corridor, they have not yet reached the level of 
development that East Asia has accomplished” (Kimura, 2006, p. 326), which is 
even more true in 2020, with the increasingly complex intra-regional East-Asian 
GVCs, connected to extra-regional European and North-American GVC networks. 
1995 2000 2009 2014 2018
mill USD % mill USD % mill USD % mill USD % mill USD %
Indonesia 4346 20.8 -4550 n.a.* 4876.8 11.2 21810.4 16.8 21979.9 14.4
Malaysia 3007 14.4 1309.7 12.6 1405.1 3.2 10875.3 8.4 8071.6 5.3
Singapore 7208.8 34.5 6390.9 61.4 18916.8 43.6 73284.5 56.3 77630.5 50.8
Thailand 2004 9.6 3280.2 31.5 6411.5 14.8 4975.5 3.8 13205.1 8.6
Vietnam 1780 8.5 1289 12.4 7600 17.5 9200.1 7.1 15500 10.1
Philippines 1578 7.5 1726 16.6 1963 4.5 5814.5 4.5 9832.3 6.4
Brunei 582.8 2.3 600.2 5.8 371.2 0.9 568.2 0.4 503.9 0.3
Cambodia 150.7 0.7 127.7 1.2 539 1.2 1726.5 1.3 3102.6 2.0
Myanmar 317.6 0.2 203.6 2,0 963.3 2.2 946.2 0.7 1609.8 1.1
Lao 88.4 0.4 33.9 0,3 318.6 0,7 913.2 0.7 1319.6 0.9
Total 20912.1 10408.4 43365.4 100.0 130114.5 100.0 152755.3 100.0
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ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) 
and the Future of Integration
The evolving regionalization driven by global and regional value chains of TNCs 
increased global competition in the increasingly multipolar world order and induced 
the ASEAN member states (AMS) to facilitate their economic development by 
trying to clear away obstacles from the activity of GVCs and RVCs. However, the 
“ASEAN way” caused a very slow movement going forward. With continuous tariff 
reductions, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement signed in 1993 was implemented in 
2010 in the first ASEAN countries (ASEAN 6). To facilitate free trade of services, 
which represents 40-70% share in the GDP of the AMS, an agreement was 
signed in 1995, but nothing moved ahead in the first 8 years. The bottleneck was 
solved by deciding on the ASEAN-X formula, enabling those ASEAN countries 
ready to liberalize certain sectors of services to go forward without any obligation 
to provide benefits to the non-participating ASEAN countries. Special bilateral 
agreements were approved from 2015 to slowly start the liberalization of financial 
services among those AMS that were more ready than others. These processes 
underline the combination of economic pragmatism and insistence on national 
sovereignty of the ASEAN member countries, 
The ASEAN Charta, signed by all 10 member countries in 2007, was the first 
legally binding agreement among AMS. It paved the way for the establishment 
of the ASEAN Economic Community, envisaged for December 2015, which 
has laid a foundation for a functioning single market and production base. The 
commitment to step on the path of AEC 2015 was induced to facilitate the activity 
of GVCs in the region in order to gain increasing competitiveness and thus a 
higher share in the crisis – hit world economy. Although the roadmap till 2015 
included strict, regular monitoring by scorecard mechanism, they did not refrain 
from the ‘ASEAN-way’; dissents were mitigated by negotiations, sanctions were 
not applied. In order to achieve the goals set forth by AEC 2015. A new integrative 
agreement – ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) - was agreed 
in 2009 and implemented in 2012. ACIA encourages such investments from 
third country investors (external to ASEAN), that are undertaking investments 
through their subsidiary based in ASEAN in further ASEAN member countries. 
Preconditions to be eligible for third country investor incentives are: 
• The company owns or controls (appoints the majority of Board Members) the 
ASEAN legal entity
• The legal entity, which was established first in the ASEAN area, has to conduct 
real business activity. 
Although some elements of AEC 2015 were not implemented fully by the original 
target date, it has created new opportunities for the regional integration and 
gradual unionization of a large trade and investment market with full global 
integration of the area. The attractiveness of the region is enhanced by the rapidly 
growing middle class of the region with huge demand for goods and services 
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(banking, insurance, tourism etc.) with an age pyramid relying on a broad base. 
In the meantime, Singapore has been experiencing a continuous decline, and 
the lowest level in birth rates worldwide for two decades, along with other East-
Asian advanced economies such as Japan, Taiwan and the Republic of Korea – 
increasing the demand for healthcare services for the aging population. 
AEC 2015 was not a final goal, but a point of reference which has been 
followed by the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, a roadmap titled: Kuala Lumpur 
Declaration on ASEAN 2025: Forging ahead together. The declaration signed by 
all members envisages a “future direction for a politically cohesive, economically 
integrated, socially responsible and a truly rules-based, people-oriented, people-
centred ASEAN”. The document signed on November 22, 2015 unfolds the 
necessity of a rules-based approach and the adherence to international human 
rights principles in the ASEAN Political and Security Community 2025 Blueprint. 
Let us refer to Surin Pitsuwan’s analysis shared on ASEAN, in March 2016 in 
Budapest, where he suggested that in the implementation, the “ASEAN way” will 
still be followed, however. 
The strategy towards AEC foresees by 2025 a “highly integrated and cohesive; 
competitive, innovative and dynamic community; with enhanced connectivity 
and sectoral cooperation” It includes “supportive policies towards innovation, 
science-based approach to green technology and development, and by 
embracing the evolving digital technology; promotion of good governance, 
transparency and responsive regulations; effective dispute resolution; and a view 
towards enhanced participation in global value chains” – as indicated in section 
10.2 of the declaration. 
There is empirical evidence, that TNCs look more and more on ASEAN as 
an integrated region. “Foreign multinational enterprises MNEs and ASEAN 
companies continued to expand in the region across a broad range of industries 
and in many cases with multiple investments. MNEs such as Aeon (Japan), Seven-
Eleven (Japan), Continental (Germany), Alibaba (China) and ASEAN companies 
such as Axiata (Malaysia), Ayala (Philippines), San Miguel (Philippines), Keppel 
(Singapore), Maybank (Malaysia), RedDoorz (Singapore) and Siam Cement 
(Thailand) expanded in multiple ASEAN countries”. Looking at the 100 largest 
non-financial ASEAN domestic companies, 77 have operations in other ASEAN 
countries. The other 23 are purely domestically focused due to the nature of 
their business (ASEAN Investment Report, 2018). ASEAN countries with varying 
economic development levels entered differently into GVCs and have achieved 
different levels of integration. They are specialized in different industries, or within 
the same industry in different stages of production according to the comparative 
advantage of their domestic economy. 
The region’s trade has substantially grown due to the conscious efforts to boost 
integration from 2007 with the ASEAN Charta and AEC-2015, 2025 strategy. 
Trade in goods, encouraged by cross-border fragmentation of production stages, 
increased from USD 2 trillion in 2010 to USD 2.8 trillion in 2018. 
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Global and Regional Value Chains in East-Asia, 
Recent Disruptions and Future Prospects
More than 60% of world trade occurs through global value chains (when 
production stages are realized at least in two countries. (UNCTAD, 2013, WTO 
2019.). From the beginning of the 21st century, international organizations 
and national public policy focus strongly on GVC movements as they impact 
advanced/emerging and developing economies alike relying on data collected 
in input-output databases (OECD-WTO TiVA database, WIOD, APEC-TIVA, 
UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database etc.). A joint effort by IDE-JETRO, OECD, the 
Research Centre of Global Value Chains headquartered at the University of 
International Business and Economics (RCGVC-UIBE) in Beijing, the World 
Bank Group, and the China Development Research Foundation, published 
Global Value Chain Development Reports in 2017 and 2019 to shed light on 
developments till 2017, the latest input-output data availability. The growth of 
global value chains has slowed since 2008-09, measured by the GVC participation 
index. 
Figure 3
World GVC participation from 1990-2018 (%)12
Figure 3. illustrates that the expansion trend of GVCs halted already with the 
2008 Great Financial Crisis (GFC) and has not gained back momentum ever 
since. Discourses on possible de-globalization tendencies and reshoring of 
certain businesses started to emerge from 2012. While certain IP-Protection-
sensitive Western-European medium-size producers withdrew from their Chinese 
ventures, the robust and expanding East-Asian market remained attractive for 
global manufacturers, placing certain stages of their production on the continent.
In spite of the declining trend, the expansion of complex global value chains (GVCs) 
was confirmed with the help of various input-output tables showing that the segment 
grew faster than GDP in 2017. In a more detailed picture, the growing importance 
of “Factory Asia” was identified, thanks to the increase of cross-country production 
sharing activities in the last decade and led by intra-regional complex GVC activities. 
The share of Asia’s total forward/backward complex GVC activities increased from 
38.5% / 39.6% in 2000 to 43.9% / 46.2% in 2017 (WTO, 2019:20) to the detriment 
of “Factory America”. While in “Factory Europe” the increasing share and volume of 
GVC activity involving Eastern Europe can be seen on account of Western Europe 
from 2000 to 2017 (Figure 4). 
Figure 4
Forward and backward (simple/complex) GVC participation, share of intra-and 
inter-regional GVC activities in manufacturing, (%), 2000 and 2017, Asia13
Note: the last set of bars represent the overall GVC participation ratios for Europe. 
Data calculated from the UIBE GVC indexes derived from the ADB 2018 ICIO 
tables. 
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Figure 5
Global GVC Participation Index 201514
As Figure 5 presents with dark colours, both CEE and Southeast Asia show 
a high participation rate in global value chains, from the ASEAN countries 
particularly Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam.  GVCs have made it 
easier for developing countries in East Asia to move away from export reliance on 
unprocessed primary products to step first into the simplest stage of manufacturing 
operations, e.g. electronics assembly activities. Research applying network 
analysis to illuminate the typology of foreign value added embedded in bilateral 
manufactured exports for the 2000-2015 identified major shifts in the period.  
The substantial role of China in GVCs is reflected on Figure 5, too. Research 
into trade in value added regarding China has shown that integration of the 
Chinese economy into GVCs and reaching new export markets are achieved 
through foreign subsidiaries processing for manufacturing exports. However, the 
biggest contributor to GDP is the domestic private sector; firms plugging into the 
supply chains and generating a major part of the domestic value added (UIB-
GVC, 2017). Certainly, the first wave of industrialization of East Asia from the 
end of the eighties, was dominated through production ties with Japan (described 
as the flying geese model with Japan’s leading role). More recently, the role of 
ethnic Chinese business networks (Chinese diaspora) has increasingly become 
an important integrative driving force in promoting regional economic integration, 
both as a major source of inward investment to China, but also as important 
network connector, which links the Chinese market with the rest of the region.
89Global and Regional Supply Chains in East-Asia...
Foreign Policy Review
These firms from advanced countries in the region use China as a low-cost 
manufacturing and export base, establishing production sites in China. At the 
same time, they have brought capital, technology and know-how into China. 
Xing and Zhang call it ‘regional network-based Chinese capitalism’, which has 
created hundreds of successful ethnic Chinese family businesses and networks 
interlocking medium-sized businesses in many countries in the region by the 
turn of the century. Thus contributing to the rise of China and her evolving 
“unavoidable” position in the regional GVCs and strengthening the Chinese 
economy (Xing, Zhang, 2009). This new pattern of regional integration is referred 
to in academic literature or economic journals as “Bamboo capitalism”, where the 
stages of the manufacturing process are carried out in various parts of the region 
before reaching their final assembly stage in China. 
China’s emergence to the position of the world’s manufacturing base in the 21st 
century, was accompanied by the surging demand for industrial equipment. In 
China, operational stock of industrial robots has grown from less than 1,000 in 2000 
to almost 650,000 in 2018, making the country home to an estimated one-quarter of 
the world’s robots and suggesting that China, as a manufacturing base, cannot be 
replaced in the short-term. The service network of major equipment manufacturers 
in China have a minimum of 100 branches, some up to 500 branches with 10,000 
employees in aftersales service, to cover their installed base (McKinsey, 2020).
Figure 6
China’s operational stock of multipurpose industrial robots in 2000-201815
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Trade tensions between the US and China evolving from early 2018, have had a 
drastic impact on global trade growth (WTO, 2019) and on FDI into East Asia too, 
due to increased economic uncertainty affecting business confidence and investment 
decisions. 
 Figure 7 
Greenfield FDI inflows to East-Asia from 2017 Q1 till 2019 Q4 in USD billion16
Authors of the ASEAN Integration Report 2019 warned, that although trade tensions 
between the US and China in 2018 “have not discernibly dented trade flows to 
and from ASEAN, although a few AMS have been more affected. Moving forward, 
however, further escalation of trade tensions could undermine trade flows as well 
as business and consumer optimism, with repercussions on regional integration 
and real economic activity.” In mid-2019, Moody’s ranked Singapore as one of the 
most vulnerable Asia-Pacific countries together with Hong Kong due to slowdown 
of Chinese demand that was clearly seen in the Singaporean GDP figures of the 
first half of 2019, despite ASEAN taking over the position of China’s largest trading 
partner from the US for the first time since 1997. Some analysts and consultants 
argued that ASEAN countries may benefit from the US-China trade frictions, as 
an alternative manufacturing base to China, for which there is empirical evidence. 
In May 2019, The American Chamber of Commerce in China conducted a survey 
among member companies in China on the impacts of the tariff increase. The survey 
addressed the tariff hikes announced for May and June 2019 from both sides, 
and concluded that the tensions certainly negatively impact the competitiveness 
of American companies; 40% of the respondents from 250 companies were 
considering or had already moved manufacturing out from China. A quarter of 
them considered Southeast Asia and 10.5% viewed Mexico as alternative location. 
Less than 6% considered moving manufacturing back to the US. (AmCham China, 
2019). The rise in Chinese wages has seen low-value and labour-intensive tasks 
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in clothing, footwear and low-cost electronic parts manufacturing starting to move 
from China to Vietnam and Cambodia from 2015. Primarily, Vietnam has been seen 
as a possible alternative for relocation. As Vietnam cannot keep up with the giant 
size of the manufacturing base, India is positioning itself, with its Make in India 
campaign, for this role too. Nevertheless, nearly 40% of all green-field FDI into East 
Asia went to China in the 2017-2019 period as well, however, 15% of investments 
went to Vietnam in the same period. Research, based on microdata from the FT 
FDI Database between October 2018 and December 2019, identified 22 investments 
relocated from China that mostly went to Vietnam followed by Malaysia, Thailand and 
Cambodia (Gopalan (2020):19). 
Even if the first phase agreement signed between the US and China on 15th 
January 2020 gave the first hope of easing the situation causing GVC disruptions, the 
outbreak of the Covid-19 epidemic in China and its turning into a global pandemic 
has brought a new shock for trade and investment activity within GVCs. In the 
electronic equipment segment, interwoven most strongly by supply chains with 
nodes in the epicentre of the Chinese epidemic outbreak as well, the impact was 
especially shocking. Relocation figures from China have still been relatively low, but 
the trend will certainly continue caused by the uncertainties attributable to Covid-19. 
Global companies are expected to diversify, for the long run, their supplier base 
and reduce their overdependence on China’s manufacturing base. While it is widely 
known that Apple’s huge assembly activity is taking place in the Chinese subsidiaries 
of the Taiwanese Foxconn, it is less known that 2/3 of their top ten suppliers are also 
located in East Asia. Disruption of supply chains due to border closures and lockdowns 
to contain the virus as well as falling demand in the globally uncertain situation still cast 
a dark shadow on East Asian economies where GVCs play a decisive role in their 
economic progress. The WTO confirmed 1.8% drop in total trade for 2019 in ASEAN 
and forecasts a drop of 13-32% in global trade across regions and a 40% drop in 
global FDI for 2020.(ASEAN Policy Brief No.3/July 2020). In the Joint Declaration of 
the Special ASEAN Summit on COVID-19 issued on April 14, 2020, ASEAN Leaders 
committed to keep markets open for trade and investment as well as strengthen 
ASEAN Economic Cooperation and Supply Chain Connectivity.
Conclusion
Where is the way forward from the two “black swan” events of the past 2.5 years 
that are still around reinforcing each other with major uncertainties? Is there a 
“New Normal” to come in East Asia? Sasidaran Gopalan, senior researcher of NTU 
CEM Singapore, claims that East Asian countries should learn to adapt to the partly 
de-globalized new realities, which will stay at least in the mid-term, while they should 
take advantage of new emerging opportunities. Hoe Ee Khor, chief economist of 
the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office, established in Singapore in 2011, 
forecasts that the region realises the need to achieve compatibility between regional 
integration and globalisation. He believes that globalisation is here to stay – and 
Asia will remain one of the strongest advocates. 
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Looking at the developments from outside the continent, ASEAN member countries 
and businesses in their territory will certainly seek for more resilience, while still 
remaining closely connected to GVCs. 
On the macro level:
• greater preparedness is needed for unexpected events and greater adaptability 
encouraged by policies 
• according to capabilities and endowments, AMS countries should intend to move 
up the value chain by upgrading technology and human capital 
• diversification shall be pursued in the economy e.g. best practice examples of 
Singapore advancing from electronics to biomedical research and biotechnology. 
Both sectors have shown robust growth in the first half of 2020; upgrading public 
health service after lessons from SARS in 2003 or, in the case of Malaysia, 
specializing in PPE manufacturing with great demand in the time of Covid-19 
(Malaysia had 14.2% world market share in PPE production in 2018)
• stronger focus on institutionalization of integration and positioning ASEAN as a 
common investment platform with different merits in different tasks and functions 
in order to benefit from the shortening of supply chains with more regional scope
On the micro-level: 
• companies started to realise the risks associated with the utmost fragmented 
production processes and extreme globalisation. Consultancy firms strongly 
promote this approach
• contingency plans are prepared for corporations to focus on more resilience 
including multiple suppliers for key components to enable shift if necessary
• overdependence on Chinese manufacturing is being reduced by diverting new 
investments of foreign and Chinese producers to alternative locations, mainly in 
ASEAN, to still service the growing Asian market
• shorter and more localised supply chains will hopefully lead to closer cooperation 
between state governance and foreign and local firms in considering the social 
component in order to avoid the circumstances for migrant workers which 
surfaced in Singapore with Covid-19
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Endnotes
1 Global strategy advisor and Senior Research Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of 
Public Policy, National University of Singapore, member of the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Agenda Council on Geoeconomics. Khanna held a lecture on 
16.3.2017 at Corvinus University of Budapest, as well, at the invitation of the 
PAGEO Foundation. 
2 In the paper, East Asia is applied to East- and Southeast Asia together
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3 Refers to the Agreement signed by US, Japan, Germany, UK and France in New 
York Plaza Hotel to offset trade surpluses in Japan and Europe against US, caus-
ing JPY’s 50% appreciation against USD and DM
4 Some believed that Surin Pitsuwan had a chance to be elected as General Sec-
retary of the UN, against Ban ki-Moon, but since another party than his came to 
power in Thailand, he was not nominated. The author participated in the confer-
ence on 31.3.2016 at IFAT Budapest and took precise notes of the lecture.
5 Founding members of ASEAN: Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillipines, Singapore, Thai-
land. Brunei joined in 1984
6 Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2012. Graphic 5.1. p. 62.
7 Source: ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2012. Graphic 5.5. p. 64.
8 From 2010, the product group is specified with the HS code 85: Electrical machin-
ery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders and reproducers, televi-
sion image and sound recorders and reproducers, and parts and accessories of 
such articles acknowledging the cross-border fragmentation of the manufacturing 
processes worldwide
9 Source: author’s calculations based on various tables from ASEAN Statistical 
Yearbook 2001, 2012, 2019
10 Source: author’s calculations based on ASEAN FDI Database, ASEAN Statistical 
Yearbook 2001, 2019
11 Source: author’s calculations based on ASEAN FDI Database, ASEAN Statistical 
Yearbook 2001, 2019
12 Source: Gopalan S. NTU CEM (2020)  p. 7. Figure 5. (based pm UNCTAD Eora 
Database)
13 Source: Global Value Chain Development Report. WTO 2019 p.22. Figure 1.11
14 Source: Gopalan, S. NTU NCEM (2020) p. 23.
15 Source: Chesnais Th. & Wu, T. (2020), McKinsey & Company Article August 14th, 
2020.
16  Source: Gopalan S, NTU CEM (2020) Figure 20. p. 18. (based on Financial 
